State in the Interest of A.S. (A-58/59-09)

State in the Interest of A.S. (A-58/59-09)
Argued April 27, 2010 -- Decided July 29, 2010
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, A.S., a juvenile, knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently confessed to conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree
aggravated sexual assault.
A.S. was the adoptive daughter of F.D. A.S. and F.D. lived in one-half of a duplex; the other half was
inhabited by F.D.’s daughter T.B., and T.B.’s four-year-old son C.J., who was F.D.’s grandson. While A.S. was
home with C.J. on the night of November 25, 2007, she allegedly performed fellatio on the boy for a period of
approximately ten minutes. Although A.S. told C.J. not to tell anyone about the incident, after his bath the next
night around midnight, C.J. told his mother what A.S. had done. T.B. had F.D. come over and T.B. repeated what
she heard had happened the previous day. F.D. confronted A.S. Later that night, T.B. contacted the police and at
some point during the following day, while still at home, A.S. apparently confessed to the act in the presence of T.B.
and F.D., stating that she did not know why she did it.
C.J. and A.S. were interviewed by detectives at the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office. A detective
interviewed A.S., with F.D. present. Although the interview was videotaped, a transcript or verbatim record of the
tape was not admitted into evidence at trial; however, the actual VHS cassettes, though of poor quality, were
introduced into evidence. At the outset of the interview the detective requested that F.D. read to A.S. her Miranda
rights, which she did in less than one minute without any clarification. F.D. then read aloud the portion of the form
dealing with her rights as a parent and she expressed some concerns. The detective attempted to clarify F.D.’s rights
and blamed her confusion on the fact that the form was written by a lawyer. That exchange took almost three
minutes.
F.D. and A.S. engaged in a conversation in which A.S., when asked if she wanted an attorney, inquired
about an attorney’s functions. Both F.D. and the detective explained that the attorney would represent her and, as
explained by F.D., the attorney would “make sure your rights are not violated.” In addition, A.S. was told that the
attorney would not speak for her and that she had to answer questions and answer them truthfully because that
would demonstrate that she was a “good person.” Throughout, F.D. insisted that A.S. tell the detective what she did.
Eventually, more than thirty minutes into the interview, A.S. confessed that she had “sucked [C.J.’s] tinky” for ten
minutes and then went to sleep. After A.S. confessed, the interview continued for thirty more minutes. F.D.
interjected and asked A.S. questions throughout, chastising her several times. The questions addressed to A.S. were
greeted with long periods of silence on her part, some lasting over a minute, causing the detective to say “[we] can’t
do this all night.”
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the videotaped interview, and that motion was argued as part of
A.S.’s delinquency adjudication. Counsel contended that A.S.’s confession should be suppressed because A.S.
understood neither her right to remain silent nor her right to an attorney and that her confession was not freely and
voluntarily given. Counsel also argued that F.D. had acted as an interrogator and had unduly pressured A.S. to
confess, abdicating her responsibility as a parent to A.S. and instead advancing the interests of her grandson. A.S.
testified, acknowledging that she was not yelled at or threatened, and stating that although she was in ninth grade,
she only read at a third-grade level. A.S. testified that she really didn’t want to answer the questions posed to her,
and that was why she remained silent so often during the questioning, but that questions kept coming and that she
felt pressured.
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The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress the videotaped interview. The court characterized, with
understatement, the procedure by which the Miranda warnings were given as “a little unusual” and “probably not the
best police practice.” Nonetheless, the court was satisfied that A.S. was read and understood her rights. The court
then found that A.S. had committed an act that, if performed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated
sexual assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), and adjudicated her delinquent. The court noted that there was
ample evidence in the record to support its finding whether or not it admitted A.S.’s videotaped statement into
evidence.
A.S. appealed and a “troubled” Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division applied the totality of
the circumstances test that the Supreme Court annunciated in State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000), and
determined that “the State has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that A.S.’s
confession was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily given.” The Appellate Division found that A.S. did not
understand her Miranda rights and that the efforts made to help her understand those rights were not only
ineffectual, but actually misinformed her. Additionally, the Appellate Division was concerned by F.D.’s conflict of
interest because of her relationship to both A.S. and the victim, her grandson C.J., characterizing F.D.’s role not as a
parent, but rather as an “interrogator.” In order to avoid such problems in future cases in which the parental figure
has a close relationship with both the victim and the accused, the Appellate Division posited that “the prudent
approach would be to require the presence of an attorney capable of advising the juvenile with respect to her rights
and her potential culpability, a procedure adopted elsewhere.” Despite those concerns, the Appellate Division
affirmed A.S.’s delinquency adjudication based on the other evidence in the record in light of the trial court’s
statement that A.S.’s confession was not absolutely necessary to its ruling.
Both parties appealed and the Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certification and A.S.’s crosspetition
for certification. The Court also granted the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Office of the Child
Advocate of New Jersey status to appear as amici curiae.
HELD: Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, A.S.’s confession was not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily given. In addition, the confession by far was the most damning piece of evidence against A.S. and
thus the Court cannot say that there was no reasonable possibility that its introduction into evidence contributed to
the delinquency adjudication, and so, in the particular circumstances presented in this case, the Court is constrained
to reverse A.S.’s conviction and remand for new proceedings.
1. The Court begins, as did the Appellate Division, with the decision in Presha, its seminal case addressing the
admissibility of juvenile confessions. In order for a juvenile’s confession to be admissible into evidence it must
satisfy the same standard that applies to adult confessions: that is, it must be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. The Court looks to the totality of the circumstances in making that determination. In Presha, the Court
also noted the increased emphasis being placed on punishment as a rationale underlying the juvenile justice system,
as opposed to its traditional rehabilitative purposes. In light of that paradigm shift, the Court instructed courts to
consider the parent’s role as a “highly significant factor” in the totality of the circumstances analysis used to assess
whether a juvenile’s confession was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, the mere presence of a parent is
insufficient to protect a juvenile’s rights, because presence alone cannot be said to provide the buffer between police
and the juvenile that the Court was contemplating in its decision in Presha. In order to serve as a buffer, the parent
must be acting with the interests of the juvenile in mind. (Pp. 19-22)
2. The factors relevant when making the totality of the circumstances determination include the child’s age,
education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was
repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved, prior
experience with the legal system, and the “highly significant factor” of parental involvement. A.S. was fourteen
years old at the time of the interrogation. That age put her on the cusp for heightened protections because a
fourteen-year-old is still of tender sensibilities and may have great difficulty withstanding the rigors of a police
interrogation. Furthermore, although A.S. was in ninth grade at school, she was not intellectually sophisticated. She
read at a third-grade level and had a “low-average” I.Q. of 83. In addition, she had no prior experience with the
legal system. In light of those facts, the actual efforts employed to inform A.S. of her constitutional rights were
woefully inadequate. Indeed, the detective abdicated his responsibility in that regard by having F.D. read A.S. her
rights, a procedure which tainted the interview from its outset and must not be utilized in the future. In addition,
telling a juvenile who does not understand her rights that an attorney would “make sure your rights aren’t violated”
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is an empty gesture. Moreover, the attempts to inform A.S. of her rights contained actual misinformation. An
impartial review of the videotaped interview yields convincing evidence that the “greatest care” was not taken to
protect A.S.’s constitutional rights in this case. The Court therefore concludes, upon consideration of the totality of
the circumstances, that A.S.’s confession was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given. (Pp. 22-28)
3. The Court must determine whether the admission of A.S.’s confession into evidence was harmful: that is,
whether it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. The Appellate Division, although
“troubled,” affirmed A.S.’s delinquency adjudication in large part due to the juvenile court’s assessment that even if
the videotaped statement had not been introduced into evidence, the court still would have adjudicated A.S.
delinquent. The confession by far was the most damning piece of evidence against A.S. and thus the Court cannot
say that there was no reasonable possibility that its introduction into evidence contributed to the delinquency
adjudication, and so, in the particular circumstances presented in this case, the Court is constrained to reverse A.S.’s
conviction and remand for new proceedings. (Pp. 28-30)
4. Because the Court finds that A.S.’s confession was not voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances
test as described in Presha, its decision does not hinge on whether F.D. had a conflict of interest that rendered her
unable to fulfill the parental role contemplated by Presha. The Court, however, declines to embrace a categorical
rule that an attorney must be present any time that there is perceived clash in the interests of a parent based on a
familial relationship with the victim or another involved in the investigation. Even in cases of such apparent
clashing interests, a parent may be able to fulfill the role envisioned in Presha. And in those cases where a parent is
truly conflicted, another adult – not necessarily an attorney – may be able to fulfill the parental assistance role
envisioned by Presha. (Pp. 30-33)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for new
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO, and
HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.