Kenneth Vercammen is author of the ABA "Criminal Law Forms" book.
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Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817

Thursday, August 3, 2023

Use of restraints on Juveniles

Use of restraints on Juveniles

Dated: November 9, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

It is ORDERED that the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey are amended by adoption of the attached new Rule 5: 19-4, to be effective January 1, 2017.

For the Court,

Stuart Rabner

Chief Justice

Dated November 9, 2016

5:19-4. Use of Restraints on a Juvenile [new]

(ill Instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, chains, irons, or straitjackets, cloth and leather restraints, and other similar items, shall not be used on a juvenile during a comi proceeding and must be removed prior to the juveniles entry into the courtroom. Instruments of restraint may be used if, on application to or by the comi, the court finds that:

factors:

ill The use of restraints is necessary due to one of the following

~ Instruments of restraint are necessary to prevent physical harm to the juvenile or another person; or

(ID The juvenile presents a substantial risk of flight from the courtroom; and

ill There are no less restrictive alternatives to restraints that will prevent flight or physical harm to the juvenile or another person, including, but not limited to, the presence of court personnel, law enforcement officers, or bailiffs.

Lb) In making the determination that instruments of restraint are necessary, the factors that can be considered are:

ill any past escapes or attempted escapes by the juvenile;

ill evidence of a present plan of escape involving the juvenile;

ill any credible threats by the juvenile to harm him or herself or others during comi;

iiJ evidence of self-injurious behavior on the part of the juvenile;

ill any recent history of disruptive courtroom behavior that has placed others in potentially harmful situations or presents a substantial risk of inflicting physical harm on the juvenile or others;

(fil any other factors the court deems relevant to assess present risk in the comi proceeding.

~ The court shall provide the juveniles attorney and the prosecutor an oppo1iunity to be heard before the comi orders the use of restraints. Ifrestraints are ordered, the court shall make findings of fact on the record in support of the order.

(sll If restraints are deemed necessary, the least restrictive restraints shall be used. Any restraints shall allow the juvenile limited movement of the hands to

read and handle documents and writings necessary to the hearing. Under no circumstances should a juvenile be restrained to a stationary object or another person.

Note: Adopted November 9, 2016 to be effective January 1, 2017.

 

Use of a Juvenile in Theft of Automobiles

Use of a Juvenile in Theft of Automobiles

a. A person who is at least 18 years of age who knowingly uses, solicits, directs, hires or employs a person who is in fact 17 years of age or younger to commit theft of an automobile is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8, a conviction under this section shall not merge with a conviction for theft of an automobile. Nothing contained in this act shall prohibit the court from imposing an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-7; nor shall this act be construed in any way to preclude or limit the prosecution or conviction of any person for conspiracy under N.J.S.2C:5-2, or any prosecution or conviction for any other offense.

b. It shall be no defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor mistakenly believed that the person which the actor used, solicited, directed, hired or employed was older than 17 years of age, even if such mistaken belief was reasonable.

 

Tuesday, March 24, 2020

33:1-81 Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person revised 2019, no more mandatory loss of DL

33:1-81 Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person  revised 2019, no more mandatory loss of DL

33:1-81  Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor

fine 500-1,000
court costs and other penalties
33 :1-81 Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person.
   It shall be unlawful for:

   (a)   A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or

   (b)   A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or

   (c)   Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or

   (d)   Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.

   Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.

   In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.

   amended 1939, c.246; 1953, c.37, s.4; 1964, c.40; 1979, c.265; 1983, c.574; (s.2 eff. date amended 1985, c.113, s.2); 1985, c.113, s.1; 1991, c.169, s.1; 2019, c.276, s.10.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500

Wednesday, March 4, 2020

2A:4A-43 Disposition of delinquency cases

2A:4A-43 Disposition of delinquency cases
   24.   Disposition of delinquency cases. a. In determining the appropriate disposition for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent the court shall weigh the following factors:

   (1)   The nature and circumstances of the offense;

   (2)   The degree of injury to persons or damage to property caused by the juvenile's offense;

   (3)   The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social service received, and out-of-home placement history;

   (4)   Whether the disposition supports family strength, responsibility and unity and the well-being and physical safety of the juvenile;

   (5)   Whether the disposition provides for reasonable participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, provided, however, that the failure of a parent or parents to cooperate in the disposition shall not be weighed against the juvenile in arriving at an appropriate disposition;

   (6)   Whether the disposition recognizes and treats the unique physical, psychological, and social characteristics and needs of the child;

   (7)   Whether the disposition contributes to the developmental needs of the child, including the academic and social needs of the child where the child has intellectual disabilities or learning disabilities;

   (8)   Any other circumstances related to the offense and the juvenile's social history as deemed appropriate by the court;

   (9)   The impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

   (10) The impact of the offense on the community; and

   (11) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child.

   b.   If a juvenile is adjudged delinquent, and except to the extent that an additional specific disposition is required pursuant to this section, the court, in accordance with subsection i. of section 2 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-21), may order incarceration pursuant to section 25 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-44) or the court may order any one or more of the following dispositions:

   (1)   Adjourn formal entry of disposition of the case for a period not to exceed 12 months for the purpose of determining whether the juvenile makes a satisfactory adjustment, and if during the period of continuance the juvenile makes such an adjustment, dismiss the complaint; provided that if the court adjourns formal entry of disposition of delinquency for a violation of an offense defined in chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes the court shall assess the mandatory penalty set forth in N.J.S.2C:35-15 but may waive imposition of the penalty set forth in N.J.S.2C:35-16 for juveniles adjudicated delinquent;

   (2)   Release the juvenile to the supervision of the juvenile's parent or guardian;

   (3)   Place the juvenile on probation to the chief probation officer of the county or to any other suitable person who agrees to accept the duty of probation supervision for a period not to exceed three years upon such written conditions as the court deems will aid rehabilitation of the juvenile;

   (4)   Transfer custody of the juvenile to any relative or other person determined by the court to be qualified to care for the juvenile;

   (5)   Place the juvenile under the care and responsibility of the Department of Children and Families so that the commissioner may designate a division or organizational unit in the department pursuant to P.L.1951, c.138 (C.30:4C-1 et seq.) for the purpose of providing services in or out of the home.  Within 14 days, unless for good cause shown, but not later than 30 days, the Department of Children and Families shall submit to the court a service plan, which shall be presumed valid, detailing the specifics of any disposition order.  The plan shall be developed within the limits of fiscal and other resources available to the department.  If the court determines that the service plan is inappropriate, given existing resources, the department may request a hearing on that determination;

   (6)   Place the juvenile under the care and custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families for the purpose of receiving the services of the Division of Children's System of Care of that department, provided that the juvenile has been determined to be eligible for those services under P.L.1965, c.59, s.16 (C.30:4-25.4);

   (7)   Commit the juvenile, pursuant to applicable laws and the Rules of Court governing civil commitment, to the Department of Children and Families under the responsibility of the Division of Children's System of Care for the purpose of placement in a suitable public or private hospital or other residential facility for the treatment of persons who are mentally ill, on the ground that the juvenile is in need of involuntary commitment;

   (8) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363)

   (9)   Order the juvenile to make restitution to a person or entity who has suffered loss resulting from personal injuries or damage to property as a result of the offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent.  The court may determine the reasonable amount, terms, and conditions of restitution.  If the juvenile participated in the offense with other persons, the participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution. The court shall not require a juvenile to make full or partial restitution if the juvenile reasonably satisfies the court that the juvenile does not have the means to make restitution and could not reasonably acquire the means to pay restitution;

   (10) Order that the juvenile perform community services under the supervision of a probation division or other agency or individual deemed appropriate by the court.  Such services shall be compulsory and reasonable in terms of nature and duration.  Such services may be performed without compensation, provided that any money earned by the juvenile from the performance of community services may be applied towards any payment of restitution or fine which the court has ordered the juvenile to pay;

   (11) Order that the juvenile participate in work programs which are designed to provide job skills and specific employment training to enhance the employability of job participants.  Such programs may be without compensation, provided that any money earned by the juvenile from participation in a work program may be applied towards any payment of restitution or fine which the court has ordered the juvenile to pay;

   (12) Order that the juvenile participate in programs emphasizing self-reliance, such as intensive outdoor programs teaching survival skills, including but not limited to camping, hiking, and other appropriate activities;

   (13) Order that the juvenile participate in a program of academic or vocational education or counseling, such as a youth service bureau, requiring attendance at sessions designed to afford access to opportunities for normal growth and development.  This may require attendance after school, evenings, and weekends;

   (14) Place the juvenile in a suitable residential or nonresidential program for the treatment of alcohol or narcotic abuse, provided that the juvenile has been determined to be in need of such services;

   (15) Order the parent or guardian of the juvenile to participate in appropriate programs or services when the court has found either that such person's omission or conduct was a significant contributing factor towards the commission of the delinquent act, or, under its authority to enforce litigant's rights, that such person's omission or conduct has been a significant contributing factor towards the ineffective implementation of a court order previously entered in relation to the juvenile;

   (16) (a) Place the juvenile in a nonresidential program operated by a public or private agency, providing intensive services to juveniles for specified hours, which may include education, counseling to the juvenile and the juvenile's family if appropriate, vocational training, employment counseling, work, or other services;

   (b)   Place the juvenile under the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1995, c.284 (C.52:17B-170) for placement with any private group home or private residential facility with which the commission has entered into a purchase of service contract;

   (17) Instead of or in addition to any disposition made according to this section, the court may postpone, suspend, or revoke for a period not to exceed two years the driver's license, registration certificate, or both of any juvenile who used a motor vehicle in the course of committing an act for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. In imposing this disposition and in deciding the duration of the postponement, suspension, or revocation, the court shall consider the circumstances of the act for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and the potential effect of the loss of driving privileges on the juvenile's ability to be rehabilitated.  Any postponement, suspension, or revocation shall be imposed consecutively with any custodial commitment;

   (18) Order that the juvenile satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile;

   (19) Order a parent or guardian who has failed or neglected to exercise reasonable supervision or control of a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent to make restitution to any person or entity who has suffered a loss as a result of that offense.  The court may determine the reasonable amount, terms, and conditions of restitution; or

   (20) Place the juvenile, if eligible, in an appropriate juvenile offender program established pursuant to P.L.1997, c.81 (C.30:8-61 et al.).

   c. (1) If the county in which the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent has a juvenile detention facility meeting the physical and program standards established pursuant to this subsection by the Juvenile Justice Commission, the court may, in addition to any of the dispositions not involving placement out of the home enumerated in this section, incarcerate the juvenile in the youth detention facility in that county for a term not to exceed 60 consecutive days.  The decision by the court to incarcerate a juvenile shall be made in accordance with subsection i. of section 2 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-21).  Counties which do not operate their own juvenile detention facilities may contract for the use of approved commitment programs with counties with which they have established agreements for the use of pre-disposition juvenile detention facilities.  The Juvenile Justice Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations from time to time as deemed necessary to establish minimum physical facility and program standards for the use of juvenile detention facilities pursuant to this subsection.

   (2)   A juvenile shall not be incarcerated in any county detention facility unless the county has entered into an agreement with the Juvenile Justice Commission concerning the use of the facility for sentenced juveniles. Upon agreement with the county, the Juvenile Justice Commission shall certify detention facilities which may receive juveniles sentenced pursuant to this subsection and shall specify the capacity of the facility that may be made available to receive such juveniles; provided, however, that in no event shall the number of juveniles incarcerated pursuant to this subsection exceed 50% of the maximum capacity of the facility.

   (3)   The court may fix a term of incarceration under this subsection that is in accordance with subsection i. of section 2 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-21) and:

   (a)   The act for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent, if committed by an adult, would have constituted a crime or repetitive disorderly persons offense;

   (b)   Incarceration of the juvenile is consistent with the goals of public safety, accountability, and rehabilitation and the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors as set forth in section 25 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-44); and

   (c)   The detention facility has been certified for admission of adjudicated juveniles pursuant to paragraph (2).

   (4)   If as a result of incarceration of adjudicated juveniles pursuant to this subsection, a county is required to transport a predisposition juvenile to a juvenile detention facility in another county, the costs of such transportation shall be borne by the Juvenile Justice Commission.

   d.   Whenever the court imposes a disposition upon an adjudicated delinquent which requires the juvenile to perform a community service, restitution, or to participate in any other program provided for in this section other than subsection c., the duration of the juvenile's mandatory participation in such alternative programs shall extend for a period consistent with the program goal for the juvenile and shall in no event exceed one year beyond the maximum duration permissible for the delinquent if the juvenile had been committed to a term of incarceration.

   e.   In addition to any disposition the court may impose pursuant to this section or section 25 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-44), the following orders shall be included in dispositions of the adjudications set forth below:

   (1)   An order to perform community service pursuant to paragraph (10) of subsection b. of this section for a period of at least 60 days, if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of theft of a motor vehicle, or the crime of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10, or the third degree crime of eluding in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2; and

   (2)   (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363)

   (3)   An order to perform community service pursuant to paragraph (10) of subsection b. of this section for a period of at least 30 days, if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the fourth degree crime of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:20-10.

   (4)   (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363)

   f.   (1) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363)

   (2)   (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363

   (3)   Deleted by amendment, P.L.2019, c.363)

   g.   Whenever the court imposes a disposition upon an adjudicated delinquent which requires the juvenile to perform a community service, restitution, or to participate in any other program provided for in this section, the order shall include provisions which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, accountability for offenses committed, fostering interaction and dialogue between the offender, victim and community and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the community.

   L.1982, c.77, s.24; amended 1988, c.44, s.16; 1988, c.72, s.1; 1993, c.133, s.1; 1995, c.280, s.10; 1997, c.81, s.11; 2001, c.408, s.3; 2004, c.130, s.6; 2006, c.47, s.18; 2012, c.16, s.1; 2019, c.276, s.1; 2019, c.363, s.2.

Saturday, February 22, 2020

Suppressiopn denied here where juvenile ran from police STATE IN THE INTEREST OF N.H.,

Suppressiopn denied here where juvenile ran from police
STATE IN THE INTEREST
OF N.H.,

     A Juvenile.
___________________________

                 Submitted October 7, 2019 – Decided January 15, 2020

                 Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.

                 On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                 Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
                 No. FJ-07-0653-1
                                 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                      APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                      DOCKET NO. A-4896-17T2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.


PER CURIAM N.H. appeals from the family court's order adjudicating him a delinquent. He argues the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a handgun found after a detective ordered him to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed him, performed a pat-down search and discovered the handgun in N.H.'s left pant leg. N.H. argues his initial encounter with the police was not, as the motion judge found, a field inquiry but an investigatory stop that was unsupported by the required reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity at the time, and that the subsequent stop and pat-down search was the fruit of the initial unlawful seizure. Unpersuaded, we affirm. The motion judge, following an evidentiary hearing at which Officer Tashawn Bryant and Detective Jermin Spencer testified, found that a telephone caller to the East Orange Police Department reported a shooting in the vicinity of a high school. Bryant was dispatched to the area to locate victims, witnesses or suspects. While en route to the area, Bryant heard a dispatch from a lieutenant posted to the Real Time Crime Prevention Center (CPC). An audio recording, played during Bryant's cross-examination at the suppression hearing, contained the verbatim dispatch: "All will be advised with [sic] two males stepping off from that area. They were going eastbound of Springdale from Prospect. One had on orange pants." Bryant saw two individuals who matched the description given in the lieutenant's dispatch and transmitted: "All right I have the two males one with A-4896-17T2 2 the orange pants walking eastbound [on] Springdale"; she requested backup units and gave a description of the clothing worn by both males. Before Bryant stopped her police vehicle, a plain-clothes detective in an unmarked vehicle drove "into a driveway in front of the two individuals blocking their passageway," and another uniformed officer in a marked vehicle exited his vehicle. The judge further found the detective exited his vehicle and "flashed a badge to . . . identify himself," whereupon one of the males, later identified as N.H., ran. During the evidentiary hearing, N.H.'s counsel told the motion judge that he wanted Bryant to "admit factually what is occurring on the [video]tape, which is that [Bryant's] car is still moving and the detective is out in [sic] and the officer, another marked unit is parked alongside." The judge told counsel he had "established that"; and that Bryant stopped the car before she got out, meaning she was still in a moving vehicle when N.H. began to run. After Bryant exited her vehicle, she saw an object in N.H.'s right hand as he ran. Although she believed the object was a handgun, she radioed only for pursuing officers to use caution. She also transmitted the color of N.H.'s clothing and his direction of travel. Spencer heard Bryant's transmissions, saw a male wearing orange pants running in the area described by Bryant, drew his gun and ordered the male, A-4896-17T2 3 N.H., to the ground. N.H. complied, was handcuffed and frisked; Spencer seized the gun. We defer to the trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress, "unless they were 'clearly mistaken' or 'so wide of the mark' that the interests of justice require[] appellate intervention." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 245 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). In State v. S.S., our Supreme Court extended that deferential standard of review to "factual findings based on a video recording or documentary evidence" to ensure that New Jersey's trial courts remain "'the finder of the facts[.]'" 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note to 1985 amendment). The Court explained that "[p]ermitting appellate courts to substitute their factual findings for equally plausible trial court findings is likely to 'undermine the legitimacy of the [trial] courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.'" Id. at 380-81 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note to 1985 amendment). The trial court's application of its factual findings to the law, however, is subject to plenary review. State v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325, 328 (App. Div. 1999). We, therefore, review de novo the A-4896-17T2 4 motion judge's conclusions that the first encounter the plain-clothes detective had with N.H. was a field inquiry and that the pat-down search followed a justifiable investigatory stop. An officer is not prohibited from approaching a person and engaging in a voluntary conversation—a field inquiry. State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497 (1986); State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div. 2001). A field inquiry does not violate Fourth Amendment 1 protections "so long as the officer does not deny the individual the right to move." State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447 (1973); see also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 273-74 (2017) (citing State v. Egan, 325 N.J. Super. 402, 410-11 (App. Div. 1999)). "A field inquiry is permissible so long as the questions '[are] not harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)). "The officer's demeanor is relevant to the analysis." State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (citing Davis, 104 N.J. at 497 n.6). "For example, 'an officer would not be deemed to have seized another if his questions were put in a conversational manner, if he did not make demands or issue orders, and if his questions were 1 U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45-46 (2011) (recognizing that, like the Fourth Amendment, the "parallel language" of N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures). A-4896-17T2 5 not overbearing or harassing in nature.'" Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Davis, 104 N.J. at 497 n.6). "An encounter becomes more than a mere field inquiry when an objectively reasonable person feels that his or her right to move has been restricted." Ibid. The critical inquiry when determining whether a field inquiry was converted into an investigative detention is whether a reasonable citizen under the same circumstances would have felt that the officer restrained his or her right to move by physical force or a show of authority. State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 164-66 (1994) (citing U. S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)). Although the motion judge mentioned that the detective, when he pulled his unmarked vehicle "into a driveway in front of the two individuals[,] block[ed] their passageway," the judge concluded that the officer, by so operating the vehicle, flashing his badge and identifying himself "was [making] an appropriate field inquiry." We agree. The judge found the detective "did not have the opportunity to even approach [N.H.] and the other gentleman . . . [t]o ask if they were willing to answer some questions." The detective's display of his badge—especially considering he was not in uniform and his vehicle was not marked—was not the A-4896-17T2 6 "physical force or . . . show of authority" sufficient to restrain N.H.'s freedom of movement. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. It was simply a prudent way to show the pair he was a police officer and not someone alighting from a car to accost them. We are unconvinced by N.H.'s attempt to analogize the facts of this case to those in Rosario. There a police officer who received an anonymous tip that the defendant was selling drugs recognized defendant's car while on patrol. Rosario, 229 N.J. at 267. The officer positioned his car at a perpendicular angle approximately seven to ten feet in front of the defendant's car, partially confining the defendant's vehicle to an enclosed area. Id. at 268. He then activated the rooftop flood light on his patrol car, aimed it at the defendant's car, and, after noticing that she was still in the car, approached her and asked her to produce identification. Ibid. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded the encounter was an investigative detention because someone sitting in a lawfully parked car outside her home who suddenly finds herself blocked in by a patrol car that shines a flood light into the vehicle, only to have the officer exit his marked car and approach the driver's side of the vehicle, would not reasonably feel free to leave. [Id. at 273.] A-4896-17T2 7 The Court also commented that the officer's request for identification, "[a]lthough not determinative . . . reinforce[d] that this was an inv estigative detention." Ibid. Here, N.H. ran before the detective uttered a word. There was no question posed, nor command given. And, obviously, N.H. was not prevented from leaving. In short, N.H. fled before the field inquiry could begin. The detective's mere act of pulling his vehicle in front of N.H. into a driveway is not a show of authority that, without more, would cause someone to believe he was not free to leave. This street encounter was the type of legitimate police practice that courts have not restricted. The Mendenhall Court recognized the United States Supreme Court's prior acknowledgment of the "need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws." 446 U.S. at 554. "Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished." Ibid. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). The police pursuit and subsequent seizure of N.H. was justified as an investigatory stop, familiarly known as a Terry stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Our analysis of the propriety of an investigatory stop balances the A-4896-17T2 8 competing interests between "a citizen's privacy and freedom of movement" and "proper law[]enforcement activities." Davis, 104 N.J. at 504-05. Investigative stops are justified, even absent probable cause, "if the evidence, when interpreted in an objectively reasonable manner, shows that the encounter was preceded by activity that would lead a reasonable police officer to have an articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or would shortly occur." Id. at 505. Courts are to determine whether the totality of the circumstances gives rise to an "articulable [and] particularized" suspicion of criminal activity, not by use of a strict formula, but "through a sensitive appraisal of the circumstances in each case." Ibid. Our Supreme Court recognized the two-step analysis set forth in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), for determining whether the totality of circumstances creates a "particularized suspicion." A court must first consider the officer's objective observations. The evidence collected by the officer is "seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." "[A] trained police officer draws inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person. The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second, a court must determine whether the evidence "raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." A-4896-17T2 9 [Davis, 104 N.J. at 501 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.)] N.H. argues that, like the defendant in Tucker, his flight did not justify a Terry stop. See Tucker, 136 N.J. at 169-70. Unlike the defendant in Tucker, who was observed by police simply sitting on a curb before he fled, was chased and stopped, id. at 161-62, police pursued N.H. only after Bryant saw the object in his hand as he ran. The Tucker Court noted our observation that what the record in that case "does not show is also highly persuasive: no observed criminal activity; no particularized suspicious conduct . . .; no reports of recent nearby crimes; [and] no descriptions of recent crime suspects[.]" Id. at 169 (quoting State v. Tucker, 265 N.J. Super. 358, 360 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 136 N.J. 158 (1994)). The record here, however, as the motion judge found, does contain sufficient facts to justify the investigatory stop that resulted in the seizure of the gun from N.H. From Bryant's credited testimony, and his review of the body-cam and dash-cam recordings, the motion judge found that as soon as N.H. began to run, Bryant broadcast that she saw an object in N.H.'s hand. That fact, together with the observation of N.H. and his companion leaving the area of the reported shooting, led the motion judge to conclude police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that justified a Terry stop. The judge also determined that A-4896-17T2 10 Spencer—with full knowledge of Bryant's broadcast about the object in N.H.'s hand, N.H.'s orange clothing and his direction of travel—was justified in stopping the male wearing orange pants and patting him down for weapons. Inasmuch as both the attempted initial inquiry by the detective and Spencer's investigatory stop and frisk fell within the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001); State v. Piniero, 181 N.J. 13, 20-21 (2004), the seizure of the gun was constitutionally permissible, and the motion to suppress was properly denied. Affirmed.

Thursday, May 2, 2019

Office space for rent

Office space for rent
PROFESSIONAL OFFICE SPACE IS AVAILABLE IN EDISON LAW OFFICE
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817

 Excellent space for an Attorney, Financial Planners, Accountant, Insurance Agents, and other Business Professionals as a 2nd location or location to meet clients in Edison.

  The offices are located on the 1st floor of the building.
2 rooms office   
office room # 6 approx 12.4 x 9.4        
and front room appr 8 x 9 -office room # 5
plus use of reception room  16.6 x 7.2
and use of storage area in basement 
   Previously used by Robert Blackman, late former Judge and Prosecutor of Edison
         
$500 per month [was $600]
Call 732-572-0500
    Owner of building is local attorney, Kenneth Vercammen who handles Municipal Court, Estate Planning & Probate, and Criminal Law. 

Monday, January 7, 2019

Metuchen NJ Public Defender Volunteer Internships available for students and persons that want to help veterans and poor persons

   Metuchen NJ Public Defender Volunteer Internships available for students and persons that want to help veterans and poor persons

      The Public Defenders provide Indigent individuals charged with criminal or serious motor vehicle charges with free or limited cost legal defense. The Public Defender of Metuchen invites students interested in attending law school or a career in law enforcement to apply to serve as volunteer interns. Volunteer Law Clerk interns will attend Wednesday evening and occasional Friday morning court sessions. Please post for your students. If your law school uses Handshake or Simplicity and this is not currently posted, please email us at Vercammenlaw@njlaws.com

      Information regarding our program plus bio information can be found on the website.
www.njlaws.com/public-defender-volunteer.html
      Interested students must mail or fax a cover letter indicating the internship they are applying for and resume. If no personal cover letter by student, the resume will not be considered. Emails not accepted. After sending the resume and cover letter, call the office. The Public Defender does not have a paid staff so it is difficult to post to multiple websites. 
Mail or fax cover letter and resume to
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq.
Public Defender for the Borough of Metuchen
c/o 2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
Fax 732-572-0030

Very truly yours,
KENNETH   VERCAMMEN,
Metuchen Public Defender Volunteer Internship Mentor Program Director

 PUBLIC DEFENDER OF METUCHEN VOLUNTEER LEGAL INTERNS NEEDED

  Court times: WEDNESDAY 1pm PM [approx]- 7:30 PM,   once a month Friday 9-12, plus hearing preparation work.

             Volunteer Internship Description:
-Interview Clients facing charges in Municipal Court including Drug Possession, Drunk Driving, Assault, Driving While Suspended and other criminal and traffic offenses
-Make demands for Discovery on Prosecutor and review police reports
-Attend hearings and learn from experienced trial attorneys
-Prepare Motions to Suppress Evidence and Motions to Compel Discovery
-Conduct appropriate Legal research
-Acquire skills in Criminal Law and Procedure by active participation
-Participate in Public Relations activities for NJ State Bar Association, American Bar Association ABA and help organize seminars
- Update Lists of Prosecutors, Judges and Attorneys for publication of
    NJ Municipal Court Law Review
-      Revise criminal and traffic law Articles and submit to Law Journals and criminal law websites.
-      Add new criminal cases, criminal statutes and criminal articles to our Public Defender blog: http://criminal-jury.blogspot.comand other legal blogs and websites for use of clients and the general public.
-      Add Motor vehicle statutes, criminal court rules to websites to assist persons charged with criminal, traffic, DWI and municipal court complaints
-    Revise criminal and traffic law Articles and submit to Law Journals and criminal law websites.
-     -Help edit the  new book “Handling DUI and Drug Possession Defense” written by Kenneth Vercammen
        Volunteer to help indigent people charged with criminal and motor vehicle offenses of magnitude. In additional to time in court, you will be given research assignments. You can work more hours if you want. Help people less fortunate than you who are down on their luck.
        Program lasts 12 weeks Minimum Volunteer time commitment in summer- 18 hours per week. For Summer- Law students only. Fall & Spring 12 hours per week. Send cover letter and resume. After sending resume, call to schedule interview  732-572-0500.
         Mail or fax cover letter and resume to
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq.
Public Defender for the Borough of Metuchen
c/o 2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817      
 Fax 732-572-0030
   No emails