NJSA 39:4-50.14 Operation by person who has consumed alcohol who is below age to purchase alcoholic beverages (in addition to penalties under any other law) Kiddie DWI
Loss of license for not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days and perform community service for not less than 15 days nor more than 30 days. In addition, must satisfy program and fee requirements of the IDRC or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety. Penalties shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15, N.J.S.A. 33-1:81, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, or any other law. For information regarding points or surcharges contact the Motor Vehicle Commission. For information about car insurance eligibility and points contact your car insurance company or the New Jersey Department of Insurance.
1. Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or more, but less than 0.08%, by weight of alcohol in his blood, shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State or shall be prohibited from obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of not less than 30 or more than 90 days beginning on the date he becomes eligible to obtain a license or on the day of conviction, whichever is later, and shall perform community service for a period of not less than 15 or more than 30 days.
In addition, the person shall satisfy the program and fee requirements of an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety as prescribed by the chief administrator.
The penalties provided under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S.2C:33-15, R.S.33:1-81, R.S.39:4-50 or any other law.
Friday, October 23, 2009
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
NJSA 2A:4A-20. Short title This act shall be known and may be cited as the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice."
NJSA 2A:4A-20. Short title This act shall be known and may be cited as the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice."
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Passenger Pat down during traffic stop permitted if belief gang member is armed and dangerous Arizona v Johnson 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009)
Passenger Pat down during traffic stop permitted if belief gang member is armed and dangerous Arizona v Johnson 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009)
While patrolling near a Tucson neighborhood associated with the Crips gang, police officers serving on Arizona’s gang task force stopped an automobile for a vehicular infraction warranting a citation. At the time of the stop, the officers had no reason to suspect the car’s occupants of criminal activity. Officer Trevizo attended to respondent Johnson, the back-seat passenger, whose behavior and clothing caused Trevizo to question him. After learning that Johnson was from a town with a Crips gang and had been in prison, Trevizo asked him get out of the car in order to question him further, out of the hearing of the front-seat passenger, about his gang affiliation. Because she suspected that he was armed, she patted him down for safety when he exited the car. During the patdown, she felt the butt of a gun. At that point, Johnson began to struggle, and Trevizo handcuffed him. Johnson was charged with, inter alia, possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor
Held: Officer Trevizo’s patdown of Johnson did not violate the Fourth Amendment ’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
While patrolling near a Tucson neighborhood associated with the Crips gang, police officers serving on Arizona’s gang task force stopped an automobile for a vehicular infraction warranting a citation. At the time of the stop, the officers had no reason to suspect the car’s occupants of criminal activity. Officer Trevizo attended to respondent Johnson, the back-seat passenger, whose behavior and clothing caused Trevizo to question him. After learning that Johnson was from a town with a Crips gang and had been in prison, Trevizo asked him get out of the car in order to question him further, out of the hearing of the front-seat passenger, about his gang affiliation. Because she suspected that he was armed, she patted him down for safety when he exited the car. During the patdown, she felt the butt of a gun. At that point, Johnson began to struggle, and Trevizo handcuffed him. Johnson was charged with, inter alia, possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor
Held: Officer Trevizo’s patdown of Johnson did not violate the Fourth Amendment ’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
Arrest and Search by police based invalid arrest warrant does not suppress drugs & gun found Herring v United States 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)
Arrest and Search by police based invalid arrest warrant does not suppress drugs & gun found
Herring v United States 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)
When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Herring v United States 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)
When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Police can now question defendant even if counsel assigne
Police can now question defendant even if counsel assigned. Michigan v. Jackson is overruled, which had forbid police from initiating interrogation of a criminal defendant who has invoked his right to counsel at arraignment. Montejo v Jackson __ S. Ct. ____ Decided May 26, 2009 Docket No. 07–1529
The admission of the Drug lab certificates violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASS
The admission of the Drug lab certificates violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASSACHUSETTS __ S. Ct. ____
No. 07–591. Decided June 25, 2009
At petitioner’s state-court drug trial, the prosecution introduced certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that material seized by police and connected to petitioner was cocaine of a certain quantity. As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn to before a notary public and were submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted. Petitioner objected, asserting that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court disagreed, the certificates were admitted, and petitioner was convicted. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s claim that the certificates’ admission violated the Sixth Amendment .
Held: The admission of the Drug lab certificates violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
(a) Under Crawford, a witness’s testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U. S., at 54. The certificates here are affidavits, which fall within the “core class of testimonial statements” covered by the Confrontation Clause, id., at 51. They asserted that the substance found in petitioner’s possession was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine of a certain weight—the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. Not only were the certificates made, as Crawford required for testimonial statements, “under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” id., at 52, but under the relevant Massachusetts law their sole purpose was to provide prima facie evidence of the substance’s composition, quality, and net weight. Petitioner was entitled to “be confronted with” the persons giving this testimony at trial. Id., at 54.
(b) The arguments advanced to avoid this rather straightforward application of Crawford are rejected. Respondent’s claim that the analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not “accusatory” witnesses finds no support in the Sixth Amendment ’s text or in this Court’s case law. The affiants’ testimonial statements were not “nearly contemporaneous” with their observations, nor, if they had been, would that fact alter the statements’ testimonial character. There is no support for the proposition that witnesses who testify regarding facts other than those observed at the crime scene are exempt from confrontation. The absence of interrogation is irrelevant; a witness who volunteers his testimony is no less a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes. The affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records. The argument that the analysts should not be subject to confrontation because their statements result from neutral scientific testing is little more than an invitation to return to the since-overruled decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 , which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible without confrontation. Petitioner’s power to subpoena the analysts is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Finally, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the prosecution’s task burdensome. In any event, the practice in many States already accords with today’s decision, and the serious disruption predicted by respondent and the dissent has not materialized
No. 07–591. Decided June 25, 2009
At petitioner’s state-court drug trial, the prosecution introduced certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that material seized by police and connected to petitioner was cocaine of a certain quantity. As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn to before a notary public and were submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted. Petitioner objected, asserting that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court disagreed, the certificates were admitted, and petitioner was convicted. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s claim that the certificates’ admission violated the Sixth Amendment .
Held: The admission of the Drug lab certificates violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
(a) Under Crawford, a witness’s testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U. S., at 54. The certificates here are affidavits, which fall within the “core class of testimonial statements” covered by the Confrontation Clause, id., at 51. They asserted that the substance found in petitioner’s possession was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine of a certain weight—the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. Not only were the certificates made, as Crawford required for testimonial statements, “under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” id., at 52, but under the relevant Massachusetts law their sole purpose was to provide prima facie evidence of the substance’s composition, quality, and net weight. Petitioner was entitled to “be confronted with” the persons giving this testimony at trial. Id., at 54.
(b) The arguments advanced to avoid this rather straightforward application of Crawford are rejected. Respondent’s claim that the analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not “accusatory” witnesses finds no support in the Sixth Amendment ’s text or in this Court’s case law. The affiants’ testimonial statements were not “nearly contemporaneous” with their observations, nor, if they had been, would that fact alter the statements’ testimonial character. There is no support for the proposition that witnesses who testify regarding facts other than those observed at the crime scene are exempt from confrontation. The absence of interrogation is irrelevant; a witness who volunteers his testimony is no less a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes. The affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records. The argument that the analysts should not be subject to confrontation because their statements result from neutral scientific testing is little more than an invitation to return to the since-overruled decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 , which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible without confrontation. Petitioner’s power to subpoena the analysts is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Finally, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the prosecution’s task burdensome. In any event, the practice in many States already accords with today’s decision, and the serious disruption predicted by respondent and the dissent has not materialized
Police cannot search car passenger compartment if occupant already arrested. Arizona v. Gant 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
Police cannot search car passenger compartment if occupant already arrested. Arizona v. Gant 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that an arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court's reversal of Defendant's drug conviction is affirmed.
Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that an arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court's reversal of Defendant's drug conviction is affirmed.
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