SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE
DIVISION
STATE IN THE
INTEREST OF H.M., a minor.
_____________________________
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Submitted April 25, 2012 - Decided
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Ostrer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Salem County, Docket No. FJ-17-74-11.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant
H.M. (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent State of New Jersey (Melissa L. Lowe, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This
case requires us to construe L. 1986, c. 34, which amended the
statute on obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, to
make certain violations a fourth-degree crime. The issue arises in H.M.'s appeal from an adjudication of juvenile
delinquency. Following a bench
trial, the Family Part found H.M. committed an offense that if committed by an
adult would constitute fourth-degree obstructing, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1b. The court acquitted H.M. of additional
charges that would have constituted the adult crimes of third-degree resisting
arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(3)(a), and second-degree hindering
apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(5). We reverse, and remand for entry of an adjudication of
delinquency on the lesser included disorderly persons form of obstructing, and
for a new disposition.
I.
H.M.'s offense
arose out of a police encounter with an adult. On May 25, 2010, Millville Police Officer Matthew Radcliffe
while on automobile patrol observed Charles Hannah on the porch of the home
where H.M. resided. There was an
outstanding warrant for the arrest of Hannah on charges of attempted
murder. Officer Radcliffe advised
Hannah he was under arrest pursuant to the warrant. Hannah then attempted to flee into the house, but the door
was locked. The officer exited his
vehicle, entered the porch and attempted to place Hannah under arrest.
According to Officer
Radcliffe's testimony, as Hannah struggled, he called for H.M. to unlock the
door. H.M. then opened the
door. Hannah fell into the
house. As Officer Radcliffe
shouted that Hannah was under arrest, H.M. shut the door against the officer,
pushing him out of the house, and then H.M. locked the officer out. Officer Radcliffe testified he ultimately
gained entry into the home by kicking the door off its hinges. He struggled with Hannah inside the
house. H.M. shouted at the officer
using vulgar terms to get out of the house. However, H.M. did not physically interfere as Officer
Radcliffe subdued Hannah and brought him out of the house, where the officer arrested
him with the assistance of other officers. An assisting officer then attempted to arrest H.M. for
hindering the apprehension of Hannah, and H.M. refused to offer his hands for
the placement of restraints and had to be physically subdued.
Officer Radcliffe's
testimony was corroborated in part by Sergeant Mike Harvey, who testified that
he responded to the rear of the property as back-up. Using his radio, he authorized Officer Radcliffe to force
entry into the residence after the officer's struggle with Hannah on the
porch. He could hear the struggle
continue in the house, but he had no personal knowledge of H.M. impeding Officer
Radcliffe's entry into the house.
H.M. testified in his
defense, along with his thirteen-year-old cousin, A.M., and his girlfriend, Cachet
Habersham, both of whom were in the house during the altercation, and H.M.'s
grandmother, the house's owner, who arrived home hours later. A.M. testified that she heard someone
banging on the door; she thought the struggle outside involved Hannah and
"my uncle." She alerted
Habersham and H.M., who went downstairs and opened the door, causing Hannah to
fall into the house.
A.M. testified
that she could see the officer on the porch after Hannah fell in, but she did
not hear the officer say anything.
She said H.M. closed the door, but she did not see H.M. shove Officer
Radcliffe out. Hannah entered the
house, and ultimately fled upstairs.
The officer started banging on the door and twisting the door knob, and
then H.M. opened the door for the officer.
Habersham was also
near the door when H.M. first opened the door, to let Hannah in, but asserted
she did not see Officer Radcliffe nearby.
She heard Officer Radcliffe kicking the door. H.M. then opened it again, and the officer entered, accusing
H.M. of obstructing justice.
H.M. admitted he
opened the door for Hannah, and saw Officer Radcliffe outside the doorway. But, he denied the officer said
anything to him. H.M. said he
closed the door, but denied he did so to obstruct the officer and he denied
using force against the officer. He
claimed Officer Radcliffe was spraying mace, and he closed the door to protect
himself from mace, but he denied knowing that the officer was trying to arrest
Hannah. While Officer Radcliffe
kicked on the door, H.M. questioned Hannah, who told him the police had a
warrant for his arrest. H.M.
claimed he castigated Hannah for bringing the police to his grandmother's
house, and told him he needed to surrender because the police were kicking on
the door. H.M. said he then opened
the door, and told Officer Radcliffe to arrest Hannah. H.M. testified that he shouted at the
officer to get out of the house only after Officer Radcliffe and Hannah upset
some furnishings as they struggled.
All defense
witnesses testified the front door showed evidence of having been kicked, and
showed traces of what appeared to be mace, but the door was not kicked off its
hinges. H.M.'s grandmother
testified about the damage to personal property in her home and on her porch.
The judge found
H.M. knew Officer Radcliffe was attempting to perform an official function when
he closed the door, but he was unpersuaded that H.M. forcibly pushed Officer
Radcliffe out of the house.
I can't tell from the evidence who he [H.M.]
believed Mr. Hannah was having the scuffle with. But, he opens the door. And then, after he opens the door, everybody agrees that Mr.
Hannah falls through the door . . . . [A]nd there's no doubt that Mr. [H.]M[.] sees the — Mr.
Hannah with the policeman at that point.
And,
the statute says for obstructing the administration of law or other government
function, a person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs, or
perverts the administration of law or other government function, or prevents or
attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official
function by means of — this is 2C:29-1, which is — a, which is what Mr.
[H.]M[.] is charged with. And, it
says, by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference, or obstacle — and I emphasize the word obstacle — or by means of
any independent [un]lawful act . . . .
And,
to me, the real question is, at the time that Mr. Hannah fell through the door
and you saw the policeman there, which is admitted, did you close the door with
the intent to obstruct the police officer. And, the police officer says he was pushing on the door when
he pushed back. But, there's no
doubt you closed the door. I
believe you closed the door to interfere with the police officer. I believe you knew the police officer
was there. He wasn't there . . .
to do anything except do something with Mr. Hannah. I believe you knew at that second that he was there to
effect a lawful action against Mr. Hannah; whether it's arrest or something
else is not really material.
But,
. . . he was performing a lawful function. You knew he was doing it, and you closed the door to put an
obstacle in his way to prevent him from carrying out the arrest . . . . And, I believe he did that purposely to
stop the arrest because otherwise, the door would have stayed open. The police officer would have come in,
which he did a few seconds later after the kicking the door. And, in that moment, Mr. Hannah ran
from the — into the kitchen, maybe in an attempt to leave, and then upstairs
and attempt to hide. And, that was
all fostered by Mr. [H.]M[.]'s actions.
So, therefore, I believe that he violated 2C:29-1. I make those findings by clear and
convincing evidence that I've heard and find that as a fact.[1]
Unpersuaded that
H.M. "pushed on the door at the same time officer was pushing on the door[,]"
the judge stated he could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that H.M. used
force, intimidation or deception in obstructing Officer Radcliffe's efforts to
arrest Hannah. Therefore, he
acquitted H.M. of hindering apprehension.
He also acquitted H.M. of resisting arrest.
At
a disposition hearing on December 21, 2010, the court confirmed that he found
H.M. guilty of fourth-degree obstruction.
The court imposed an indeterminate term of no more than one year, plus
four months of parole supervision, to run consecutive to his then-current term
of incarceration. H.M. was in
custody, having been found to have violated parole supervision that followed a
thirty-month term of incarceration.
The court rejected the defense's request that the court expressly
provide the sentence would be served consecutive to the sentence for violating
parole. The court reasoned that
the pre-existing term was not for violating parole, but was a part of the
original sentence, which was for possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose.
On
appeal, H.M. presents the following arguments:
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT H.M. VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1a (NOT
RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THE COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
DISPOSITION DUE TO ITS IMPROPER FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND ITS FAILURE
TO FIND APPLICABLE MITIGATING FACTORS (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE ORDER OF DISPOSITION SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO
REFLECT THE COURT'S INTENTION THAT THE ONE-YEAR INDETERMINATE TERM IS TO RUN
CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON H.M. FOR A PAROLE VIOLATION.
II.
H.M. argues the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of any violation of the
obstructing statute.
Alternatively, he argues the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding he committed an offense equivalent to the fourth-degree version of
obstructing; and the court failed to make explicit findings to support such a
finding. As to H.M.'s alternative
argument, we agree.
We review the
trial judge's factual findings to determine whether they were supported by
sufficient, credible evidence in the record. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162
(1964). We defer to the judge's
findings that are the product of his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses
and to develop a "feel" of the case. Id. at 161.
We do not "engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as
if [we] were the court of first instance." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). However, "[a] trial court's
interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We have no
difficulty in concluding there was sufficient, credible evidence in the record
to support an adjudication of delinquency on a violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1a — disorderly persons obstructing the administration of law. However, the evidence did not support,
nor did the court expressly find defendant was guilty of the additional
elements essential to a finding of fourth-degree obstructing. We turn first to the statute.
As originally
enacted, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 provided it was a disorderly persons offense
to obstruct the administration of law.
The statute provided:
A person commits a disorderly persons offense if
he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other
governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from
lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation,
force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently
unlawful act. This section does
not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to
arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any
other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference
with governmental functions.
[L. 1978, c. 95, now codified at N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1a, as amended by L. 1986, c. 34, § 1, and L. 2000, c.
18, § 1.]
In 1986, the
Legislature considered legislation that, as introduced, would simply have
treated all violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 as a fourth-degree
offense. Senate No. 103
(pre-filed for introduction 1986).
The bill was amended, however, to redesignate the original paragraph of
the section as subsection a; delete the reference to disorderly persons offenses
in subsection a; add a new subsection, b, which made certain forms of
obstructing a fourth-degree crime; and provided that in all other cases, obstructing
is a disorderly persons offense. The
new subsection b provided: "An offense under this section is a crime of
the fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or investigation of a
crime or the prosecution of a person for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly
persons offense." The
Judiciary Committee explained, "S-103 was amended by the committee to
provide that the obstruction of the administration of justice would be graded
as a crime of the fourth degree only if the offense involved the obstruction of
the detection, investigation, or prosecution of a crime." Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement
to S. 103SCa (Jan. 30, 1986).[2]
There was ample
evidence to support the court's finding that H.M. violated N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1a. In closing the door
knowing the officer was present and had been struggling with Hannah, H.M.
"purposely obstruct[ed]" the officer's "governmental function .
. . by means of an . . . obstacle" consisting of the door. The court expressly declined to find
that H.M. knew Officer Radcliffe was attempting to arrest Hannah; but the court
found it sufficient that H.M. knew Officer Radcliffe was performing a
governmental function of some kind, and H.M. purposely obstructed the officer. As the judge noted, "I believe you
knew at that second that he was there to effect a lawful action against Mr.
Hannah; whether it's arrest or something else is not really
material."
However, the court
did not expressly address the elements of the fourth-degree crime. Nor are such findings implicit. The court did not find that H.M.
obstructed the "detection or investigation of a crime" or "the
prosecution of a person for a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1b. As required by Rule 1:7-4, a trial judge's findings
in a bench trial should be sufficient to enable the reviewing court "to
evaluate what elements the judge considered . . . to determine legal error." State ex rel. L.W., 333 N.J.
Super. 492, 498 (App. Div. 2000) ("[I]n a criminal, quasi-criminal, or
juvenile bench trial, a judge should . . . make specific findings of
fact regarding elements of the offense . . . .").
When a trial judge
omits reference to essential elements of an offense, and fails to make findings
related thereto, a court generally may remand for further findings. Id. at 498-99; State v. Smith,
253 N.J. Super. 145, 149 (App. Div. 1992). However, a remand is inappropriate when the appellate court
determines the record evidence is insufficient to sustain the unaddressed
elements; instead, double jeopardy principles preclude a remand and compel
acquittal. Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2151, 57 L. Ed.
2d 1, 14 (1978) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial
once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, [and] the
only 'just' remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of
acquittal."); State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 313-14 (1978).
In this case, we
are convinced there was insufficient record evidence to support a conviction of
the fourth-degree offense.
Although subsection b does not expressly state the required mens rea for
a fourth-degree offense, it is implicit that the purposeful state of mind required
by subsection a applies to subsection b.
Providing a less demanding mens rea would be inconsistent with the
legislative intent, which was simply to reserve for harsher sanctions a subset
of offenses already covered by the purposeful mens rea in subsection a. Thus, in order to prove a violation of
subsection b, the State must prove not only that an accused purposefully
obstructed detection, investigation, or prosecution, but also that the
detection, investigation or prosecution pertained to a crime, as opposed to
less serious violations of law.
We find support for
this construction by contrasting N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1b with the hindering
statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, which does not limit itself to hindering the
apprehension or prosecution of persons charged solely with crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3 covers
hindering apprehension or prosecution "of another for an offense or
violation of Title 39 of the New Jersey Statutes or a violation of
chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes." (emphasis added). This broad coverage was expressly intended
to avoid the kind of mens rea proofs required in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1b —
knowledge of the nature of the offense allegedly committed by the persons whose
detention, investigation or prosecution was obstructed.
Our present [hindering] statute applies only to
lending aid to persons whose offense amounts to a high misdemeanor. Federal law, some states, and the Code
extend the prohibition to aiding all lesser offenses. This follows from our purposes to deter obstruction of
justice . . . .
Furthermore, there are situations where the aider does not know what
crime the putative offender may have committed . . . . [I]t seems undesirable to introduce
into prosecutions of this sort an issue of law (and defendant's knowledge
thereof) as to the classification of the primary offense.
[Final Report of N.J. Criminal Law Revision
Comm'n (October 1971) (Comment no. 3 to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3).]
We find
insufficient evidence in the record that H.M. knew Hannah was accused of a
serious crime. No evidence was
presented, for example, that Hannah's alleged involvement in an attempted
homicide was widely publicized, or specifically known by H.M. The State implicitly concedes Officer
Radcliffe was not engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution
related to the attempted murder.
Instead, the State argues, "In closing the door on the officer H.M.
obstructed the officer's detection and investigation of a crime, that of his
friend [Hannah] fleeing an arrest."
We are
unpersuaded. First, once Hannah
took refuge in the house, eluding Officer Radcliffe's grasp, Officer Radcliffe
was engaged in efforts to arrest Hannah — on the warrant, and perhaps, for charges
arising out of his resisting arrest and flight. Officer Radcliffe was not detecting or investigating what he
was fully aware of, because it had occurred in his presence.
Second, the court
specifically declined to find that H.M. knew Officer Radcliffe was attempting
to arrest Hannah, as opposed to performing some other governmental
function. So, the evidence was
insufficient to show H.M. knew his obstruction pertained to Hannah's alleged
commission of a crime arising out of his flight — such as third- or
fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(2), (3), or hindering
one's own apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b.
In light of our
determination the evidence was insufficient to support a finding H.M. committed
what would have been fourth-degree obstructing, we are compelled to enter a
judgment of acquittal on that charge.
However, "a guilty verdict on a greater offense may be molded and
reduced by a court to convict on a lesser included offense upon a finding that
the conviction for the greater offense was not justified." State v.
Carlos, 187 N.J. Super. 406, 417 (App. Div. 1982), certif. denied,
93 N.J. 297 (1983). In
light of the trial judge's supported findings, the judgment should be molded to
adjudicate H.M. delinquent for what would be a disorderly persons obstructing
offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1a.
Consequently, the court must determine anew the appropriate disposition for
H.M., as he received a term of incarceration commensurate with committing the
fourth-degree offense. Compare
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(1)(f) (maximum one year incarceration for what
would constitute fourth-degree adult crime) with N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-44d(1)(g) (maximum six months incarceration for what would constitute
disorderly persons offense by adult).
Given our
determination, we do not reach the remaining issues on appeal.
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[1] We presume
the court misspoke by referring to the "clear and convincing"
standard of proof. In his
subsequent findings, he demonstrated his awareness that "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is the applicable standard of proof. H.M. apparently recognizes the court simply misspoke, as he
does not raise this as an issue on appeal.
[2] In 2000, the
statute was further amended to excise the exceptions for flight by a person
charged with a crime, and resisting one's own arrest. L. 2000, c. 18, § 1.
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